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ABSTRACT
Between Déifies and Men: A Few Untypical Remarks About the Anthropology of
Possession Cuits. —This article is based on long field work among thé Minyanka. Till
recently, possession was a major fact of religious life among thé Minyanka in Mali, who
hâve various origins but fit into a vast cultural zone known as "Bamanaya". Ail cuits
are founded on fetish objects, which, crystallizing power relationships, only keep their
power insofar as they are fed with thé blood of sacrifices. Possession is never related
complaints. Nor does it seem related to a crisis, nor, for that matter, to a reaction
against Islam. Instead, thé possessed are thé respected médiums of a deity. In this
sensé, a possession cuit tends to be a "médiation cuit" linked to thé exercise of power.
Mots-clés/Keyworcfe :Mali, cultes de possession, fétiche, pouvoir, religion, société/Ma//,
possession cuits, fetish, power, religion, society.
Benjamin F. Soares
The Frayer Economy
in a Malian Town*
In the late twentieth Century, Nioro du Sahel, an economically marginal
town in thé West African state of Mali, has become an important régional
pilgrimage center for Muslims. Each year, thousands of people, coming
not only from Nioro's neighboring villages and towns but also from other
parts of West Africa and beyond, travel to Nioro, to seek blessings, offer
gifts, and pay homage to the town's most prominent religious leaders and
their lineages. Thèse religious leaders head thé Sufi brotherhoods (Ar.
turuq) that hâve long been the prédominant institutional forms through
which Islam is practiced in thé région. And in Nioro, one finds thé rather
unusual situation where leaders of two of the region's most important rival
Sufi brotherhoods—thé Tijaniyya and thé Hamawiyya—live in thé same
rather small town.1
After becoming part of Umar Tall's Islamic state in the mid-nineteenth
Century, Nioro quickly became a major political and religious center with an
enduring legacy in thé history of West Africa.2 Though its économie rôle
steadily declined as trans-Saharan trade waned and économie activity
gravitated toward the west and the south during the colonial period, Nioro
nonetheless remained an eminent religious center in French West Africa.3
A number of factors have assured Nioro's status as an Islamic center into thé
post-independence period. The town has spécial importance as thé home
of many descendants of Umar Tall and his supporters. It is also hère that a
* Research in 1992 and in 1993-94 was funded by Fulbright-Hays, thé Wenner-Gren
Foundation, United States Information Agency/Fulbright and thé West African
Research Association/Center, and Northwestern Uniyersity. I am grateful to thé
many people in West Africa who provided information discussed hère. I wpuld
also like to thank thé following individuals for their comments and suggestions:
Jane Guyer, Karen Tranberg Hansen, Jacalyn Harden, John Harrelson, John
Hunwick, Micaela di Leonardo, and, especially, Robert Launay.
1. This contrasts with some other Muslim religious centers in West Africa such as
Touba in Senegal.
2. On thé Umarian jihad and state, see ROBINSON (1985).
3. Paul MARTY (1920:210-211) described Nioro as 'le boulevard de l'islam noir dans la
région du Haut-Sénégal' and 'le pôle de l'islam soudanais' from Saint-Louis to
Niger.
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new Suû brotherhood emerged around Shaykh Hamallah early in this
Century, reinforcing yet also transforming Nioro as a Muslim religieus
center.4 Finally, the présence of the descendants of Tall and Hamallah and
their followers have helped to keep the influence of the Wahhabiyfa or self-
styled Ahl al-Sunna in the town's immédiate vicinity negligible until very
recently.5
Located in a relatively remote and inaccessible région of northwestern
Mali, the effects of drought are today readily détectable on Nierons land-
scape. There is no great wealth extracted from the land here inlj|e forjtrf of
commodities nor is the vicinity terribly rieh agriculturally. Throughoïït the
région, the great majority has increasing difficulty meeting subsistence
needs. Since early in the colonial period, the area has had high rates of labóï
migration to areas of greater economie activity.6 In the post-independence
era, the movement of persons from this area has only increased with
continuing economie difficulties.
Nevertheless, that considérable wealth exists in Nioro is obviqus to any
visitor. Outward displays of wealth and consumption abound, at least on
the part of a small number of résidents and visitors to the town. Most
conspicuous perhaps are the numerous luxury cars seen throughout the to$pi
and the lavish homes illuminated at night by electricity from private
generators. These commodities—cars and generators among others«^-and
a considérable amount of other kinds of wealth in this town can be Ijnked,
directly or mdirectly to the town's most important religieus leaders and,
ultimately,towhatIcalltheprayereconomy. ,- ... /!.,
Recently, Murray Last (1988:196 sq.) used this idea of prayer economy^tq
describe the rather complex but pervasive practices in Kanq in Norjiern
Nigeria m which considérable sums of money are given to Musluri 'scholen'
for prayers, blessings, and Islamic medicine. People make sudi§transj|e-
tions, hè argues, in order to ensure political and financial succes^anc
build a base for such success. As he points out, the oil boom of the
made unprecedented levels of capital available for such transactions wit
profound effects on the Kano economy.7 - y ,
Contemporary Mali of course contrasts sharply with Nigeria, j^iffer-
ently situated within the world economy, Mali did not expérience suchjlçgas
of export-led economie growth and today remains a very poor country.*—Bjit
despite the obvious différences in national income and resources,
religious practices by Muslims—the giving of gifts to religieus lejdjg^ljia
large scale—make it entirely appropriate to speak about a
in Nioro. Indeed, it would be virtually impossible to understanicöTipf|i-
TRAORÉ (1983) is the most comprehensive study of Hamallah and the Haraayö3?ya,oï
'Hamalhsm' to date «w
On the Wahhabiyya m Mäh, see AMSELLE (1985), BRENNER (1993a), HA
KABA (1974), and TRIAUD (1988). rt
On the history of labor migration from this area, see MANCHUELLB (1S87, 1
Some of the changes to the economy are discussed by LÜBECK (1986).
{lorary Nioro without an examination of this local and, in many sensés,
Iransregional economy, that links thé town to the wider politieal economy.
This paper focuses on those most directly involved in the prayer economy
in Nioro, including the two religious leaders who have become major actors
on a regional and sornetimes international scale, and their numerous
followers^—elite and ordinary Muslims, both local and non-local—and
dlscusses their jrêlatipnships that set thetiontext for the often large-scale gift
Jransfersî I showdiow the prayer economy opérâtes through the circulation
of-capital—economie, political, and* spiritual or symbolic—which particular
social actors arej|bj,@»to convert from one domaiitto another with the result
that^pjarjticalarlßlaces, the economy, jtojise Geertz's language (1979), fuses
ecohpjnic anCpolitigal elites of the*towaand beyond with religieus leaders.
s w i s j u t t J j i s J a t u r e of the prayer economy points te a significant
pf religiojuspractice, a situation where ties between
and some followers are no longer mediated primarily
„particular-Su|i brotherhood but rather through
central tokeïts «of value in the society. Such a shift
tof whatttnighfrb&called the cracks in the hegemony
9).
Sjfanalysis- of the prayer economy, I offer a
objections can be raised to the conceptual-
^afojjf|ÄeÜgiSPJgpJBctices and, in particular, Muslim religious practices
jPthJi|ebÄfi?aiae»©f-an economy. In this study, I want to suggest it is an
iconomy of praetice that is operative. I employ the concept of prayer
§eonomy as an analytical tooi for understanding some—but by no means
jiiUgreligJfus practices that are linked to the economy. Thus, what follows
isjae,cessarily a-partial interprétation.
lslarn,!|Sufïsm and Saints
Thjiîprayer economy in Nioro du Sahel can only be apprehended through the
leAolip@liyS!lanci
ïregionally salient conceptions of Islam. In Arabic the
is, submission to God. To be a Muslim in most contexts
Aon?to the will of Goàand adhérence to His law (the Sharia),
ve pillars of Islam. In the part of the Sahel with
aoncerned, the priraary institutional forms of Islamic
iftice a|e the Suft brotherhoods that are characterized by a
of authority. What this means in this context is that
only^expected to submit to God and His law but one is also
enjoined to follow a religious leader who acts as a spiritual guide for ordinary
Muslims. And such a leader necessanly cornes from within the Sufi
brotherhood structure. Theoretically, then, all adults are expected to have
a relatiönship witîiaîèligious leader.
Although there is a considérable range and diversity of MusUm religious
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specialists in the région, certain ones clearly overshadow all others. Those
seen as leaders become so by birth, achievement, or some combination of
the two. Those leaders who attract many followers are thought to be
extraordinary. And the truly exceptional are thought to be saints (wali).
Muslim saints are usually men and occasionally women—living or deceased—
said to be 'friends of God' having special power and/or knowledge ema-
nating from God.8 In this setting, people often equate power as it relates to
their religieus leaders with force in its spiritual and material sensés, sug-
gesting authority in its Weberian formulations (e g Weber 1947; cf. B. S. Turner
1974). Given the déférence to others in a hierarchy leading ultimately to
God, there is a sense that power émanâtes from God who favors certain
persons, making them more knowledgeable and more powerful than
others (cf. Denny 1988). For this reason, saints are usually highly
respected, revered, as well as feared.9 But, not, it should be noted, by
everyone.
In Nioro, the two most celebrated religious leaders resident in the town
come from lineages of religious specialists. And many of their respective
followers consider them to be saints. The first, Muhammadu, is from a
lineage that traces descent from the prophet Muhammad. His father,
Shaykh Hamallah (c. 1883-1943), was the founder of the Hamawiyya Sufi
brotherhood, a branch of the Tijaniyya. Proclaimed by his followers to be a
qutb ('pole'), the highest ranking saint of his time, Hamallah died in exile in
France. Muhammadu is the widely recognized leader of the Hamawiyya
and, therefore, at the pinnacle of this Sufi hierarchical structure. His
followers extol him for what they call his prodigious powers. The second
and considerably older of the two is Cerno'Hady Tâll, a"direct descendant of
Umar Tall, the leader of the nineteenth Century jinad. Airtong the most
prominent of Umar Tall's descendants in western Mali, Hady is a renowned
leader of the Tijaniyya in the broader région. His réputation for prodigious
powers is also widespread.
That sainthood is not open to just anyone, not even to other religious
leaders, cannot be emphasized enough. Others who might actually develop
réputations as minor religious personalities in Nioro must necessarily submit
to the authority of one of the main religious leaders. The latter live
surrounded by their numerous followers, including minor religious leaders,
and operate large Sufi centers where people gather for prayers, instruction,
and guidance. Whatever différences there might be between the two
leaders in status, réputation and even their followings, their authority is
unquestionably based in large part on descent from the two principal
nineteenth and early twentieth Century Muslim religious figures associated
with the town. In the post-independence period, they have been involved
9.
In this essay, I use the ambiguous word power as it relates to religious leaders,
following West Africans' usage.
On this subject for neighboring Songhay in the past, see HUNWICK (1996).
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in similar ways in the prayer economy and have become among its most
important actors.10
Saints, Followers, and Gifts
The establishment of a relationship with a Muslim religious leader, even a
one-time visit (ziyara), may have many layers of meaning. An individual
actor—a man or a woman—may have complex motives and interests in
cultivating a relationship with a saint, and the maintenance of such a
relationship cannot be reduced to rationally maximizing behavior (cf. Cruise
O'Brien 1971, 1975). In fact, because people are expected to have a reli-
gious guide, a relationship with a religious leader is often considered a pious
act or an attempt to adhère to conventions of proper Muslim behavior
(cf. Gellner 1969).
In Nioro, as members of lineages with historical ties to either religious
leader's lineage, many people usually take their relationships with one of the
religious leaders for granted, even if such relationships are not enacted
mechanically. Indeed, although there are those who might be said to have
been born followers of a certain leader, in practice, one finds considérable
variation in the nature of their interactions with religious leaders and in style
of religiosity, dependent upon a number of factors, including—but not
limited to—âge, éducation, social status, and individual temperament.11
While some might actually become f ormally initiated into one of the two Sufi
brotherhoods in the town, for many, relationships to a religious leader are
premised more on nominal membership and attachment to a brotherhood
and/or its titular head. Over time, individuals, groups of people and,
on occasion, entire communities may renew, strengthen, downplay or
actually sever ties with a religious leader (Villaion 1995), for a whole host of
reasons.
Despite the existence of inherited and nominal ties, followers—individ-
uals and groups of people—may often have reasons of a very pragmatic or
instrumental nature for interacting with a particular religious leader. The
two religious leaders assume or are called upon by their followers to assume
a number of important rôles, most notably, as mediators in dispute resolution
and as providers of relief for the indigent. In addition, individuals often
cultivate a relationship with a particular religious leader with the intention or
hope of having personal concerns or interests addressed by the religious
leader whom they assume bas considérable power. On the one hand,
followers with primarily spiritual goals in mind might seek instruction from a
religious leader that leads to advancement within the Sufi initiatie structure.
10. The différences between the two religious leaders are important though not for the
analysis of the prayer economy that follows.
11. Space limitations prevent me from addressing these here.
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On the other hand, reasons for individuals to interact with a religieus leader
that are of a more this-worldly nature include the pursuit of wealth, power,
social prestige, progeny, and good health.12
One of the most salient features of saint-follower relationships is the
giving of gifts, The word gift most accurately captures the local idiom for
describing the transfer of objects from followers to saints. In the town's
vernaculars, hadaya (a loan word from the Arabic hadiyya, pi. hadaya) is
used exclusively for those things given to elevated religious leaders.13 The
centrality of gifts and gift-giving to the relationships between religious
leaders and followers can be related to conceptions of Islam and proper
Muslim behavior, as well as to regionally spécifie conceptions of power. In
Islam, Muslims are not only encouraged but commanded to give, especially
charity, to others. The standard Maliki legal text used in West Africa states
unequivocally that things transferred 'in view of a reward in another world'
are not to be considered gifts but rather alms (Ruxton 1916: 263). Be that
as it may, by giving gifts to others, people are generally seeking to assure
their place in the next world, but they frequently wish to obtain merit and
God's blessings in the world in which they are living as well. In Nioro, the
merit that people state that they hope to obtain in giving gifts to their religious
leaders is bound up with notions of baraji, which translates somewhat loosely
from the region's vernaculars as 'divine recompense'.14 Upon reeeipt of
gifts, the religious leader gives blessings—in the local vernaculars duwa
(another loan from Arabic)—in conformity-with the Sünnafof4he prophet
Muhammad as recounted in the various collections dfeHadith. ™~,. i
Many claim that all that.the religious Jeaders^olNiojoihave-riwealth,
numerous followers, as well as the »intangible ̂ kmowljtdge'Änd^power
associated with Islamic mystical practice—is atgïft ffom-CSofl.1^ -They,*the
ordinary followers, in turn, pay homage to tfce»reMgiöus^leaders* in part
through gift-giving to them, because, by heing%lessed and favored, they are
foremost in the hierarchy of authority before God. What one finds then is
12. This statement is based on interviews and conversations-with a wide range of
Muslim religious speciah'sts, their followers^and cptics.
13. This word is used in Bambara, Hassaniyya, Pular/Fulfulde, and Soninke. It is
similarly used elsewhere in West Africa, see STEWART (1973). Religious leaders Si
Nioro are often the récipients of other things loosely categorizable withinAhe ruteic
of gifts such as charity or 'sacrifices' (sadaqa) and even alms-taxes (zakat). t l do
not address the rôle they play in the prayer economy other than to note that they
are ostensibly for redistribution according to the precepts of Islamic law. The
subject of such ritual sacrifice has recently been described by COMBS-SCHILLING
(1989) for Morocco in rather essentialist terms which are critiqued explicitly by
BOWEN (1992) and somewhat more implicitly by LAUNAY (1992).
14 In Bamana, Pular/Fulfulfe, and Soninke; cf BAILLEUL (1981); BOMOU & SCHERRER
(n.d.); DNAFLA (1993); and TAINE-CHEIKH (1990). The word seems to be
derived from the Arabic bara'a meaning 'exculpation or settlement [of debtj'. See
DELAFOSSE (1955).
15. In this context, either one of the more conventional words for gift in the region's
vernaculars (e g dokkal in Pular/Fulfulde) or a word with the sense of blessing
(e g baraka) is used rather than hadaya.
not unlike the situation described by Ibn Khaldun (1967:304) in which persons
with a réputation for piety are frequently the récipients of gifts because 'the
great mass believes that when they give them présents, they serve God'. In a
sense, the transfers of such gifts are the exchange of economie capital by
followers for the spiritual or symbolic capital that religious leaders possess.
While one can say that people believe it is basically good, morally
correct, and even potentially meritorious to give such gifts, there is a strong
sense of obligation that permeates more fully the practice of gift-giving by
ordinary followers. Many feel compelled to give gifts to a religious leader,
especially at certain tunes of the year. For example, at the yearly visits in
Nioro, each religious leader formally receives visitors who corne in déléga-
tions from villages and/or lineages. People line up by the hundreds to greet
the religious leader and to give him gifts. While the expérience of those
involved might not be akin to the 'communitas' described by Victor Turner
(1973) in which individuals are essentially equals, in these visits they are
engaging in what might be characterized as 'ritual communication' (Van der
Veer 1994). That Is," these followers are expressing their identities as
followers of one of the religious leaders and/or as members of a Sufi
brotherhood, and, in doing so, they have access to the symbolic capital which
they receive in the form of blessings and/or merit in exchange for their gifts.
But in addition to such communal interactions, certain followers may
hâve other, more particularistic reasons to solicit one of the religious leaders.
At thé disposai of thé religious leaders is a wide variety of Islamic esoteric
sciences, including, among other things, petitionary prayers, khalwa ('mys-
tical retreat'), riyada ('spiritual exercises'), and amulets that they or their
associâtes can deploy on behalf of supplicants in order to obtain all the
things, such as wealth, that they might désire. And thèse sciences are
almost invariably deployed in exchange for large gifts.
In Nioro, one finds not only a wide variety of persons—both local and
non-local—who visit and give gifts to thé prominent religious leaders, but
also a considérable range in thé value of gifts. Without discussing young
girls 'given' for marriage, or boys and girls 'given' for domestic service, such
gifts can range from the very modest—a few measures of grain or a single
coin—to thé munificent—large sums of cash and commodities such as new
Cars. " Thus, those things considered gifts (hadaya) include some of the most
important material tokens of value in the wider society. In this context,
no *clear break exists between gifts and commodities (Appadurai 1986;
cf. Gregory 1982), many commodities and 'luxury' goods being given as
gifts. Hère, as in other places in the Islamic world, a gift is expected to be
commensurate with thé prestige and status of both the religious leader and
thé giver, as well as with thé nature of a giver's request.16 Thus, an extrav-
16. EICKELMAN (1976: 178). Some évidence suggests that gift-giving by certain high
status followers is part of thé quest for what BOURDIEU (1984) calls social
'distinction' in thé European context and similar to thé 'tournaments of value'
described by APPADURAI (1986).
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agant gift generally indexes a major intervention via the esoteric sciences on
behalf of a wealthy giver.
Despite minor différences in the engagement of the two religions leaders
in the economy, their interactions with their followers are similarly
patterned. They basically live off the gifts from their followers, frequently
channeling the money into other economie activities. The ultimate effect is
that these religions leaders are able to accumulate considérable wealth much
like their historical predecessors discussed by Ibn Khaldun (1967: 305).
Known for their generosity, the religieus leaders also redistribute a portion
of the gifts as alms to the poor and/or as support for their large entourages.
Elite Followers and Religious Practice
Some of the considérable wealth one finds in Nioro does come from some of
its inhabitants. Indeed, a sizeable amount of the wealth of the two religieus
leaders in Nioro is traceable to ordinary non-elite followers living in and
around the town. Nioro is also the birthplace and home of many pros-
perous merchants and traders, some of whom have built considérable
fortunes in the post-ïndependence period. A number of these enterprising
individuals and families are based in Nioro, in other Malian towns and cities,
in neighboring countries, and as far away as Gabon and North Araerica.
Some of the most financially successful among them have longstânding ties
with the town's religious leaders.17 - * • * * * • _ s ^
In addition to the ordinary locaLMuslinjs and^the^ore, ^eJJTheeJed
merchants, the religious leaders attract othei-promingitloUo^ers^parijLOjt
whom are affluent by any standards. Çgopie frqm^acjôss^fr^coph^ne^Wesî
Africa visit and make gifts to the two reüglous leaders in Nioro., Sucbuvisitors
include high-ranking civil servants, very influential political appointées,,and
religious leaders. And the relations between Nioro's religious leaders and
heads of state are almost legendary.18 ,4uch high-status followers—heads of
state, merchants, government ministers, and their kin—give large and expen-
sive gifts, while many others of similar means and status who are unablejar
unwilüng to go openly to Nioro send gifts on their behalf. Association with
such high-status people undoubtedly enhances the réputations of the saints,
though too close association with figures of power, especially political power,
17. This generalization needs some qualification. Some Wahhabis who are merchants
living elsewhere in Mali do come from Nioro. Paradoxically enough, some
prominent Wahhabis—usually known as anti-Sufls—are known for their large and
overt gifts to some of Mali's Sufi religious leaders in Nioro and elsewhere. In
Nioro, unlike other places in Mali, there is not a separate Wahhabi mosque.
18. For instance, Muhammadu was close to Mali's president Moussa Traore. For his
part, Cerno Hady is close to the immédiate family of president Bongo of Gabon.
These relations are discussed briefly by DIALLO (1988).
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carries potential dangers.19 Clearly, this is not a situation in which thé rôle
of Islam is that of a counter-society movement or a refuge for thé weak
(cf. Coulon 1988).
The relationships which provide the context of such gift-giving are
subject to some constraints. Since travel to Nioro is more difficult than to
many other areas of Mali, it takes considérable expenditure to reach thé
town. It is clearly the economie resources and greater 'leisure' time that
many successful merchants, civil servants and politicians hâve which gives
them greater mobility to initiale or renew and maintain ties with thé cele-
brated religious leaders in Nioro. There is regulär commercial airline service
between Bamako, thé capital of Mali, and Nioro, and many, if not the major-
ity, of thé passengers on thé flights between thé two towns are followers
and/or kin of the two religious leaders.
In général, not only do thé more affluent who are not resident in the town
have greater mobility to see the religious leaders, but also these people have
greater access to these leaders as a direct result of the size and value of their
gifts and/or their high status. Thus, those with access to or even at times
control of some of the society's central tokens of value—cash and com-
modities—also have greater access to the religious leaders and their spiritual
capital. There seems to be a process whereby commercial and bureaucratie
elites are joined or fused with religious leaders, as Geertz (1979) identified in
Sefrou in Morocco. Somewhat crudely stated, the transfer of money and/or
gifts in Nioro helps ultimately to reproduce these elites. But, even more
than the simple reproduction of elites, this points to an important shift in the
way in which religious practice is organized at least for some, mostly, elite
followers of the religious leaders. In contrast to those ordinary Muslim
followers whose relationships with either religious leader are premised on at
least nominal membership in one of the two Sufi brotherhoods, the relation-
ships of these elites is largely mediated by way of access to political and
economie forms of capital.
The Prayer Economy and the Fragility of its Hegemony
Thus far, I have attempted to identify some of the features of the prayer
economy as it opérâtes in the town. Because of their descent and répu-
tations, the two most prominent religious leaders are the most important loei
of symbolic capital in Nioro. In général, followers—elite and non-elite—
interact with one of the religious leaders in order to have access to their
symbolic capital. Although ordinary non-elite followers might not have
19. It is important to note that a religious leader may refuse a gift, an act that might
constitute a form of public or semi-public admonishment. For a historical per-
spective on some of the issues related to Muslim religious leaders and power, see
BRENNER (1993b).
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direct access to the religieus leaders, they are able to have at least symbolic
access to them through their gifts. This is precisely what happens with the
communal gift-giving during the yearly visits. In interacting with the religious
leader, followers express an overall group identity as they communicate to
themselves and to others as pious Muslims submitting to a leader whom they
believe to be close to God. Additionally, individuals or groups of people
may also benefit materially through the networks of redistribution or the
intervention of the religious leader as mediator, though these might
ultimately be of less importance than the group identity expressed. - •*
As for the elite followers, a fair number of affluent people, bothlocal and
non-local, have greater access to Nioro's religious leaders. Although an
important part of their interest in establishing a relationship with one of
these religious leaders may be related to acts of piety, not unrelated are the
many diverse personal goals for which the symbolic capital of the religious
leader is sought. The giving of gifts of greater value, which political and
economie power allows, serves ultimately to confer additional power on
these elite followers. In a sense, they are able to convert one form of capital
(political, economie) into another (spiritual/symbolic). And in turn, there
is usually the hope that this spiritual capital will be transformed into
additional political and economie power or resources. This is not to suggest
that all people are in any way completely assured of the efficacy oHheir
leaders' spiritual capital. Uncertainty at Ieast4n«this world i&aß fver present
factor for a good many people. For, the rej|||o|jsmie*adasr|he process is
slightly different. Through the exchange of giftsifcjiäCiß&gSi praters,* and
the employment of their knowledgejof tiœ-Isterig ej|ojerie,s|äejacef, their
spiritual capital is convertedrinte additioriate"i@trr4çfandâ)oH^5tapQ^èt
£ ^''«$jg'ijj£:*- %?%£ "* ™"^ .v»~»~.™|? •""&;:. ï ^~*i -*"
and resources. ... ~ - f j f ; - _
As I have triedfto suggest; one ofitallntost ^KojfeÉffca^BsS^^je
'* ï •"iî!s? t f^- * ^-a^-M'ijjjg'^ - '?* "w£" _"T t w&prayer economy is that ties between^H^soieiapac^rspndjtM rejugraos
leaders are mediated through access to solnfeöïthg cèntraAokerïSiotvalue in
the society. Although the preceding discussion seems to suggest that this
points to the hegemony of the prayer economy, I want to argue instead that
it illuminâtes some of the cracks in this hegemöfty.^
For many years, a persistent anti-Sufi discourse associated with the
Wahhabiyya, not to mention Malian secularists, has come mainly from
outside Nioro. This discourse, often rather vocal at times, calls directly?into
question the kinds of rôles that religious leaders like those in Nioro assume,
challenging their elevated status and frequently criticizing some of their and
their followers practices, including the large-scale gift-giving.21 This is what
might be called the external critique that many people in Nioro, the religious
leaders included, have tried to counter in part through their opposition to the
20. My use of the concept hegemony follows Raymond WILLIAMS'S reading of Gramsci
(1977).
21. The actions of some of those associated with such critiques are not unambiguous.
See fn 17 supra.
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establishment of Wahhabi institutions (mosques and schools) in Nioro and
its environs.
At the same time, some rather pointed internai critiques also exist. In i
recent years, the change in religious practice discussed in this paper has been '
questioned by a number of ordinary followers in Nioro. Many complain
that they too have serious problems—individual and communal—that need
addressing, but they, unlike the more affluent, are unable to have direct
access to the religious leaders. In some instances, individuals and groups
have sharply curtailed their transfers of gifts, stating quite explicitly that they
think that their interests have been slighted in favor of those who happen to
give gifts of much greater value to the religious leaders. Some make what is
perhaps an even more trenchant critique in asserting that the religious
leaders of Nioro, their piety notwithstanding, cannot possibly be saints
because true saints are concerned with the next world and have no need for
such lavish homes, pars, and ostentation.22 And, finally, association with
regimes that have been overthrown or have faltered in recent years cannot
fail to bring into question for at least some people the efficacy of the
symbolic capital of such religious leaders.
Whüe it is not possible to déclare that the Wahhabis are in any way
directly responsible for such critiques within Nioro, their présence, even at a
distance, has undoubtedly had some influence on the discourse on religious
practice. Taken together, all of these critiques—internai and external,
implicit or otherwise—have the potential to disrupt the opération and
reproduction of the prayer economy. In short, they point to cracks in the
hegemony of the prayer economy, showing just how fragile this hegemony is.
Northwestern University
Department of Anthropology, Evanston.
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thé prayer economy opérâtes through thé circulation of capital—economie, political,
and spiritual or symbolic—which social actors convertfrom one domain to another, with
thé resuit that in particular places, thé economy fuses économie and politica! elites with
the religious leaders. This feature of the prayer economy marks a significant shift in the
organization of religious practice, a situation where ties between religious leaders and
some, mostly elite followers are no longer mediated primarily through membership in a
particular Sufi brotherhood but rather through access to some of the central tokens of
value in the society. Such a shift also points to the fragility of the hegemony of the
prayer economy that is discussed in the last part of the essay.
RÉSUMÉ
L'économie de la prière dans une ville malienne. — Cet article examine le rôle de
P« économie de la prière » dans une ville malienne, c'est-à-dire la gamme de pratiques
à la fois complexes et répandues grâce auxquelles des présents sont offerts en abon-
dance à des chefs religieux musulmans. Il est consacré à l'étude des chefs renommés de
deux confréries sufi, de leurs nombreux disciples et des relations qui définissent le
champ de ces transferts de dons. Il montre que I'« économie de la prière » fonctionne
grâce à la circulation intense de capital — économique, politique et symbolique — que
les acteurs sociaux"convertiraient d'un domaine à l'autre et qui conjoint, en certains
lieux, les intérêts des élites économiques et politiques avec ceux des chefs religieux. Les
caractéristiques de l'économie de la prière représentent un changement important de
l'organisation de la pratique religieuse, situation dans laquelle les relations entre les
leaders religieux et les clients des autres élites ne sont plus médiatisées par l'apparte-
nance à une confrérie sufi particulière mais par le recours à des symboles vitaux pour la
société. Un tel glissement met aussi en lumière la fragilité de la domination de l'éco-
nomie de la prière, aspect qui est analysé dans la dernière partie de l'article.
Keywords/yVtofs dés: Mail/Mali, \s\am/lslam, political economy/économ/e politique,
exchange/éc/iange.
A B S T R A C T
This paper discusses thé prayer economy in a Malian town, thé rather complex but
pervasive practices in which gifts are given to certain Muslim religious leaders on a large
scale. It focuses on thé celebrated leaders of two Sufi brotherhoods, their numerous
followers, and their relationships that set the context for the gift transfers. It shows how
